AFRICAN PANORAMA
WATCHING THROUGH THE BIRDS' EYES
Harry A. Greaves, Jr. has been a hawkish member of the resurgent reactionary group that is now on the corridors of power in Monrovia. He has therefore been the closest ally of Ellen Sirleaf, the arch priestess of reaction in contemporary Liberia. In their class struggle which culminated into a 14-year long internecine war, Greaves and the Madame were together in the trenches compulsively maneuvering to remove the proletarian Samuel Doe from power. In 1985, he helped cajole the ill-fated General Quiwonkpa to throw himself at Doe’s military machine. Shreds of the “celebrated” general’s dismembered body were seen in the streets of Monrovia. Greaves also together with the Madame raised money to support the Taylor military campaign. The armed resistance offhandedly snuffed lives out of 250, 000 men, women and children.
On June 1, 1990, shortly following the first gun sound in Butuo, Greaves envisioned not only the fall of the Doe dictatorship but also the manner of government to replace it. He then translated his vision into a piece now dubbed the “Greaves Proposal”. According to Byron Tarr (another Sirleaf ally), the Madame lauded the proposal and was poised to implement it should power be transferred to the resurgent group on a silver platter.
That was long before Harry flirted with Taylor’s gang-like government, long before he courted the corrupt Gyude Bryant government and much long before he got married to the kleptomaniac Sirleaf government which has now ditched him. From the Siah Nyanseor Archive, African Panorama hereby publishes the Greaves Proposal.
I. FORMS AND METHOD OF GOVERNMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL RULE V.S. RULE BY DEGREE
1.1 The system of government envisaged in the Liberian Constitution is one based on elections. It contains no provisions for situations where political power results from military conquest. The system of check and balances inherent in the separation of powers (between the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary), the guarantees of individual rights against the coercive power of government, the rules relating to the transfer of power, the broad principles underlying the procedures for arbitrating disputes---this whole constitutional edifice is constructed upon the basic premise that a government comes into power through an electoral mandate from the people.
1.2 Clearly the National Patriotic Front government will not be coming to power through elections and cannot therefore base its legitimacy on the Constitution. Rule by decree seems, in the circumstances, to be the only practical alternative.
1.3 Rule by decree is not synonymous with arbitrariness or the absence of the rule of law. Indeed, if the NPF government is to have any credibility, it must conduct itself in a manner that demonstrates to the world that conduct itself in a manner that demonstrates to the world that, despite the fact that it has not been democratically elected, it nevertheless respects commonly accepted notions of justice and fair-play. Perhaps the most concrete demonstration of its commitment to the rule of law would be the announcement of a suspension of only those portions of the Constitution which are incompatible with unelected government (e.g. provisions relating to elected offices), rather than suspending the entire Constitution.
1.4 The National Patriotic Front would do its international image immeasurable good if it scrupulously observed those constitutional provisions which relate to basic civil and human rights. The obverse would also be true. In the present international climate, any widespread breach of human rights would almost certainly cost the government dearly in terms of loss of international financial support---something it can ill afford given the bankrupt treasury it will be inheriting and the need to undertake a massive reconstruction effort in the country.
THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
1.5 One of the first tasks the NPFL will have to undertake is to set up the appropriate machinery to govern. (The line that follows is not readable…) …that flow from a regime rule by decree, the Judiciary as an institution should be left undisturbed. With this said, the remaining choices revolve around what institutional arrangements are necessary to carry out the legislative and executive functions of government.
1.6 There are many theoretical and empirical models from which to choose. But reduced to its barest essentials, the choice is between two separate bodies, as at present, or a single legislative-cum-executive entity. These two options are considered below.
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Option 1: Council & Cabinet
1.7 Following the 1980 coup d’etat, M/Sgt. Doe and his companions established a structure that sought to mimick the system that had preceded them. The bicameral legislature was replaced by the People’ Redemption Council (PRC), while executive functions were retained in the cabinet ministries and autonomous bureaux. But despite the superficial similarities, this arrangement very soon proved to be unworkable, for the following reasons.
1.8 First, the military officers who comprised the PRC lacked the know-how to govern. Most of them could not read or write and had had very little prior administrative or leadership experience. Furthermore, they never came to understand the distinction between law-making (their function) and the day-to-day administration of the bureaucracy (which was really the responsibility of cabinet officers). As a result, they were constantly meddling in the latter’s affairs, so much so that at one point the whole structure of government was in danger of collapsing.
1.9 An attempt was made to improve the situation by appointing “coordinators”; supposedly educated people whom it was thought could school their uneducated PRC wards in the craft of governance. But that proved an unmitigated disaster because most of the coordinators were barely an improvement on their “students”. In some cases they were worse. In keeping with the adage that “a little learning is a dangerous thing”, many sought to conceal their ignorance and/or inexperience in a dogmatism that made them impervious to reason. In the end the whole panoply of PRC committees and coordinators had to be abolished to avert total chaos.
Option 2: Expanded Cabinet
1.10 There is no need to repeat the PRC mistake. An alternative approach would be to do away with a separate council altogether, having instead an expanded Cabinet, consisting of the heads of ministries and/or selected autonomous bureaux, complemented by a number of advisors.
1.11 The advantages of this arrangement are three-fold: first, on economic grounds, it avoids the need to finance what would otherwise almost certainly be an expensive additional layer of bureaucracy at a time when the new government is already going to be strapped for cash. Secondly, it avoids bringing into being another institution with the potential for complicating the processes of government. And lastly, it would open the way for putting into place a more streamlined form of government, in which the heads of the various administrative units would exercise more authority and, thereby, be made more directly accountable to the head of government and the Liberian people for their performance.
STREAMLINING THE GOVERNMENT
1.12 The central government bureaucracy currently consists of 20 ministries and 11 autonomous bureaux. A detailed list is attached. There is considerable waste in the existing structure: some ministries duplicate the work of other ministries (e.g. Rural Development), while in one case (Transport) a ministry was created for the sole purpose of rewarding one of Doe’s numerous female companions.
1.13 The new government should undertake as a matter of urgency an immediate review of the governmental apparatus, with a view to streamlining it. Where overlapping functions exist one of the entities should be dissolved and funds identified for providing just and fair compensation to redundant employees. Where it makes economic sense, entities should be merged in order to avoid the added overhead of duplicate ministerial appointments. Without prejudice to such a review, a number of potential candidates immediately come to mind: Planning, Information, Lands & Mines, and National Security, in addition to the two mentioned in 1.12.
CRITERIA FOR SELECTING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
1.14 Liberians have come over the years to develop a chronic mistrust of their public servants. This is not because of some perverse streak in the Liberian psyche. Rather, it results from their having witnessed a steady stream of individuals using their public offices solely for the purpose of enriching themselves. Yet, despite the cynicism which has brought them to the point where they expect so little of their leaders, the Liberian people still pray and hope for a better day. That is why the 1980 coup was accompanied by so much rejoicing, and that is why the NPFL can expect similar jubilation when they ride into town.
1.15 But much has changed in the world and Liberia since April 1980. Because of 10 years of misrule and the devastation of the war, the reconstruction effort ahead is mammoth by comparison with what was required in 1980. At the same time, the resources available to accomplish the task are not as copious. While fleeing officials of the Doe government are reportedly making off with enormous personal fortunes, the country’s reserves are depleted and its tax base shrunken to about one-half of what it used to be---and that is without accounting for inflation.
1.16 On the external front, with the crumbling of the Soviet empire, the West today feels less incentive to woo inept Third World governments into its camp with offers of open-ended economic assistance programmes. Instead, obtaining anything beyond token assistance is going to be a tough sell, and one of the NPFL’s strongest selling points is going to be the establishment of a well managed governmental apparatus, staffed by honest, competent public servants who have a clear vision of where they wish to lead their nation.
1.17 Therefore, every effort must be made in the personnel selection process to weed out carpet-baggers and band-wagoneers: people whose primary objective in seeking public office is to line their pockets. Nothing will cause this NPF government to lose its credibility quicker than the perception that the new “Liberators“, have taken office merely to repeat the corrupt practices of the old “Liberators“. If this turns out to be the case, the judgment of history and of the Liberian people will be swift and harsh, because this war has levied an unprecedentedly high human and physical toll on the nation.
1.18 A second important principle that should be observed in the selection process is geographic and ethnic balance. While it may not be appropriate to observe a tribal quota system, and while ethnic origin should not be considered the sole, or even principal, criterion for appointment to office, ethnic diversity is essential to political stability. If the ugly scars of tribalism left by the Doe regime are to be healed, than all Liberians must once again feel that they are an integral part of the body politic, and the best way to demonstrate this is to provide for their representation somewhere within the bureaucracy, even if not at the Cabinet level.
II. ISSUES
ELECTIONS
2.1 Once the dancing is over, one of the first issues that the NPF government will have to address—and it would do well to address this sooner rather than later---will question of its long-term intentions. Does it see itself as a permanent unelected government or does it intend to seek constitutional legitimacy through the ballot box? There should be no mistaking that the manner in which the NPFL tackles this issue will to a large extent determine the response of the Liberian people and the international community to the NPF government.
2.2 Since the turn of the century, Liberians have had to endure extended periods of one-man or one-party rule (reaching its pinnacle during the presidency of William V.S. Tubman). Some of it has been benign. But too much of it has been harmful to the nation, and if there is one theme which runs through conversations amongst Liberians of all walks, about the future of their country, it is that they wish to see an end to dictatorship, no matter how well-intentioned. They have seen all too often how untrammeled power corrupts even the best intentioned leader. With Doe gone, there is just no appetite for taking the risk of a repeat performance.
2.3 Recent evens around the globe have shown that this sentiment is not limited to Liberians. The push for democracy---the right of the people to choose their leaders through the ballot box---is the motive force that drove the people of the Philippines and Eastern Europe to overturn their dictatorships. It is the same motive force that is now fuelling an explosion of anti-government activity throughout West Africa---from Sierra Leone to Gabon.
2.4 It is recommended that the NPFL announce as quickly as possible its intention to serve only as an interim government. Shortly thereafter, after consultation with the leadership of the political parties and others, it should propose a timetable for elections to usher in a return to constitutional rule. Once that is done and the government’s intentions become known, those who have been sitting on the fence “waiting to see what happens” (and let there be no doubt that there will be many such people---residents, foreign governments, business people, as well as Liberian exiles anxious to return home) will have less justification for so remaining.
2.5 On a continent notorious for liberators who, after seizing power in the name of freeing their country folk from the yoke of some nefarious dictatorship, immediately turn around and enslave them, it would be a refreshing change to have a government that broke the pattern. The response of the international community to such an eventuality would likely be overwhelmingly positive. Indeed, it could well prove to be the spark needed to energize that community into an early mobilization of resources for the reconstruction effort. By the same token, holding out will almost certainly result in a lukewarm response to the fledgling government’s plight from those able to help. So, in that respect, the ball will be firmly in the Front’s court.
2.6 The timing of the next elections I a matter for careful consideration. Two prospective dates are being discussed in the Liberian community: October 1990 and October 1991, the latter being the scheduled date under this present Constitution.
2.7 The earlier date has the appeal of ushering an elected government into office relatively quickly and thereby mitigating the debilitating effects of a long interim period, as occurred in 1980, when the economy slowly bled while investors were adopting a “wait and see” attitude. The downside is that 4-5 months may not be enough time for all contestants to mobilize and for the constitutional changes that may be necessary to participate in the elections (see 2.10).
2.8 Although the later date has the disadvantage of providing what some may consider too long a transition period, it has the overwhelming advantage of affording sufficient time to address the two concerns alluded to in 2.7 above, thereby making for a more orderly and meaningful electoral contest. It is the recommended alternative.
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
2.9 The original, Constitutional Commission draft contained many safeguards against an overbearing Executive (including a provision that would actually have had the effect of disqualifying Doe from contesting the presidency) and conflicts of interest on the part of those serving in the public domain. But by the time the Constitutional Advisory Assembly was through butchering the document, it had become a plaything for Mr. Doe and those of the assemblymen gathered in Gbarnga who saw themselves as the advance guard of the legislature of the Second Republic. The Liberian people voted in this bastardized version because the alternative of more years of Doe seemed the greater of the two evils (little did we know at the time that we would be lumbered with him anyway). Be that as it may, a number of its provisions need to be changed, some before the next elections.
2.10 One of the most potent Constitutional issues that will need to be addressed is the question of who should be eligible to run for presidential office. Under the existing Constitution, persons who have not lived in Liberia for 10 years are disqualified. But even allowing for the ambiguities of interpretation (does the clause refer to 10 consecutive years immediately preceding the elections or a sum total of any 10 years?), it would seem to be an unwarranted discrimination against those who, for reasons of political persecution or otherwise, have been constrained to live abroad for an extended period of time.
2.11 There is also the matter of whether or not those serving in the interim NPF government should be allowed to contest the elections. While the argument for a prohibition, on the grounds that “players cannot be referees”, has superficial appeal, on closer scrutiny it cannot really pass muster. Incumbents, who seek re-election, whether in the legislature or presidency, are regularly placed in that position. What should make these first elections any different? The solution to the obvious concern about incumbents using their positions to unfair advantage has more to do with establishing clear ground rules and appointing elections officers of sufficient personal stature to ensure the integrity of the process than attempting to blindside the process by a priori disqualification of particular players.
SPECIAL COMMISSIONS
2.12 There are a number of other political issues that require immediate attention, some as early as the day of takeover. Given the specialized nature of these issues, it is considered more appropriate to under take these within the context of specialized commissions, as opposed to using the regular bureaucracy.
ELECTIONS COMMISSION
2.13 Once a date has been set for elections, it will be necessary to set up the machinery to conduct them. Liberians remember only too vividly the disgraceful manner in which the process was subverted in 1984/85 because of the weakness and blatant partisanship of the chairman, Mr. Emmett Harmon, and his motley crew. Credible elections are the bedrock of any democracy. It is therefore imperative that the body charged with their conduct enjoy the confidence of the voting public.
2.14 In this regard, there are two issues that merit attention. First, the commission should be headed by some one who commands the respect of the Liberian people, someone who is not considered to have any partisan axe to grind, and someone possessed of sufficient strength of character that he/she will be able to stand up to any contestant who attempts to subvert the process, no matter how exalted.
2.15 Secondly, and in view of our experience the last time around, it may be advisable to include on the commission representatives of parties contesting those elections.
COMMISSION ON RECONSTRUCTION OF WAR TORN AREAS
2.13 Much of upper Nimba County and parts of Grand Bassa County have been devastated by the war.
1990: From Siahyonkron Nyanseor’s Archive
THE NPF GOVERNMENT ACCORDING TO HARRY A. GREAVES, JR
THE NPF GOVERNMENT ACCORDING TO HARRY A. GREAVES, JR
'THE GREAVES' PROPOSALS'
